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 34 
IMPLIED CLASS WARFARE: WHY RULE 23 
NEEDS AN EXPLICIT ASCERTAINABILITY 
REQUIREMENT IN THE WAKE OF  
BYRD v. AARON’S INC. 
Abstract: On April 16, 2015, in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit articulated its heightened standard for Rule 23’s implied 
requirement that a class be ascertainable. This standard has proven to frustrate 
Rule 23’s historical purpose of providing small-claim plaintiffs a mechanism 
through which they can economically prosecute their rights, especially in the 
context of consumer class actions. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has re-
jected the heightened standard introduced by the Third Circuit in favor of a 
“weak” interpretation of Rule 23’s implied ascertainability requirement. This 
Comment argues that Rule 23 needs to be amended to explicitly include ascer-
tainability as a requirement to class certification so that the certification process 
can be adjudicated consistently in federal courts. Further, this Comment argues 
that modeling such an amendment on the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of 
the implied ascertainability requirement will best return Rule 23 to its historical 
purpose. 
INTRODUCTION 
Benjamin Kaplan, a principal drafter of reformed Rule 23 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, hoped that the rule would “shake the law of 
class actions free of abstract categories . . . [and] rebuild the law on func-
tional lines responsive to those recurrent life patterns which call for mass 
litigation.”1 Recent developments in class action adjudication, however, 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969) [here-
inafter Kaplan, A Prefatory Note]. Reformed Rule 23 refers to the rule after its amendment by the 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules in 1966. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 
1966 amendment. The 1966 amendment was the first amendment after the Advisory Committee 
adopted the rule in 1937. See id. The amendment sought to address the problem that arises when 
there is no economic incentive for someone to enforce his or her private rights individually, and it 
resulted in a rule similar to Rule 23’s form today. See id.; see also Benjamin Kaplan, Continuing 
Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (I), 81 
HARV. L. REV. 356, 390 (1967) [hereinafter Kaplan, Continuing Work] (“The object is to get at 
the cases where a class action promises important advantages of economy and effort and uniformi-
ty of result without undue dilution of procedural safeguards for members of the class or for the 
opposing party.”). 
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have resulted in the emergence of a new abstraction, called ascertainability, 
which defendants have used as a tool to block class certification.2 
Rule 23 sets the requirements for class certification.3 The Rule re-
quires that the proposed class satisfy standards of numerosity, commonality, 
typicality, and adequacy before a court may certify it.4 Notably absent in 
Rule 23 is an explicit requirement that the class be ascertainable.5 Since 
1970, however, federal courts have looked outside the text of Rule 23 to 
include an implied ascertainability requirement to certification.6 To satisfy 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Carrera v. Bayer Corp. (Carrera II), 727 F.3d 300, 303 (3d Cir. 2013) (defendant suc-
cessfully challenging certification by establishing that its own records could not identify its cus-
tomers); see also Rachel H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 731 
(2013) (noting the ease with which an experienced class action defense attorney can frequently 
defeat certification). 
 3 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. Class action plaintiffs must have their class certified by the court 
before they are able to litigate, and Rule 23 provides the guidelines that federal courts must use 
when deciding whether or not to certify a proposed class. See id. Rule 23 was first adopted with 
the rest of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937 by the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1937 amendment. It was modeled after 
Equity Rule 38, which allowed numerous persons to bring a single action as a group if it would be 
impracticable to bring them all before the court individually. See id. It has since been amended 
seven times by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, with the first amendment taking place in 
1966 and representing the beginning of Rule 23’s current purpose to provide individuals a mecha-
nism to enforce private rights when bringing those rights individually would not be economically 
reasonable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1946, 1966, 1987, 1998, 2003, 
2007, 2009 amendments; see also Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 1, at 390 (explaining the 
policy driving the 1966 amendment to Rule 23). 
 4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1)–(3). Numerosity means that “the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable.” Id. at 23(a)(1). Commonality means that “questions of law or 
fact” in the case are “common to the class.” Id. at 23(a)(2). Typicality means that “the claims or 
defenses” of the parties representing the class will be “typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class.” Id. at 23(a)(3). Adequacy means that the parties representing the class “will fairly and ade-
quately protect the interests of the class.” Id. at 23(a)(4); see also Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue 
Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 132–37 (2015) (providing a general overview of the class certification 
process for plaintiffs). 
 5 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see also Myriam Gilles, Class Dismissed: Contemporary Judicial 
Hostility to Small-Claims Consumer Class Actions, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 307–08 (2010) (dis-
cussing that federal courts have implied an ascertainability within Rule 23 and enforce that re-
quirement along with those explicitly written within the Rule); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class 
Actions as We Know Them: Rethinking the American Class Action, 64 EMORY L. J. 399, 424–25 
(2015) (providing an overview of federal courts’ inconsistent application of ascertainability as an 
implicit requirement not explicitly written in Rule 23); Geoffrey C. Shaw, Class Ascertainability, 
124 YALE L. J. 2354, 2357 (2015) (noting that ascertainability appears nowhere within the text of 
Rule 23 despite its increasing role in federal courts’ Rule 23 analyses). 
 6 See Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 665, 669–70 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that district court appro-
priately included ascertainability in the certification inquiry); DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 
733, 734 (5th Cir. 1970) (“It is elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought 
to be represented must be . . . clearly ascertainable.”); see also Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
603 F.3d 571, 588–89 (9th Cir. 2009) (explicitly applying an ascertainability requirement); In re 
Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 30, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2006) (explicitly incorporating 
ascertainability in its Rule 23 predominance inquiry). Federal courts have implied an ascertaina-
bility requirement within Rule 23 for two general policy reasons. See Daniel Luks, Ascertainabil-
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the implied ascertainability requirement, a class must be clearly defined by 
objective criteria.7 
The implied ascertainability requirement has faced intense scrutiny.8 
Critics take issue with the fact that it is a judge-made requirement.9 Critics 
also question the requirement’s practical effect on Rule 23’s historic mis-
sion of protecting small-claim consumers who would have no incentive to 
seek relief if not for the class action mechanism.10 Small-claim consumer 
class action suits have suffered the most from the implied ascertainability 
requirement.11 
                                                                                                                           
ity in the Third Circuit: Name That Class Member, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2370–71 (2014). 
First, Rule 23 is silent on how precisely a class must be defined, so an ascertainability inquiry can 
help avoid administrative burdens that arise when a class is defined vaguely or by subjective crite-
ria. See id. Second, because the class definition tells the court “who deserve[s] notice, are entitled 
to relief, and are bound by a final judgment,” an ascertainability inquiry can help the court reach a 
more precise definition that will better protect “the due process rights of absent litigants.” See id. 
 7 See Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (defining the implied 
ascertainability requirement as requiring a clearly and objectively defined class); Byrd v. Aaron’s 
Inc. (Byrd II), 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting the first part of the Third Circuit’s two-
part implied ascertainability requirement is a class defined by objective criteria). 
 8 See Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) 
(Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review); Gilles, supra note 5, at 307–08 (quoting 
John C. Coffee & Stephen Paulovic, Class Certification: Developments over the Last Five Years, 
2002–2007, in 8 CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 2008: PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE STRATEGIES  
195–96 (2007)); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2389–92 (quoting Tom Ford, Federal Rule 23: A Device 
for Aiding the Small Claimant, 10 B.C. INDUS. COM. L. REV. 501, 504 (1969)). 
 9 See Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc re-
view) (pointing out the judicially created nature of the implied ascertainability requirement in his 
dissent); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2356 (noting that the implied ascertainability requirement is “un-
tethered” to the text of Rule 23). 
 10 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161, 186 (1974) (“The class action is one 
of the few legal remedies the small claimant has against those who command the status quo.”); 
Gilles, supra note 5, at 307–08 (quoting Coffee & Paulovic, supra note 8, at 195–96) (criticizing 
the emerging ascertainability requirement, because small-claim consumer classes that would have 
had an easy path to certification in the 1970s and 1980s are now facing new barriers to certifica-
tion); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2389–92 (quoting Ford, supra note 8, at 504) (explaining that the 
implied ascertainability requirement conflicts with the Rule drafters’ intent for Rule 23 to harness 
economies of scale and to incentivize small claimants to seek relief). 
 11 See, e.g., Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172 (holding that consumer-plaintiff could not satisfy an 
ascertainability inquiry without proposing a method by which corporate-defendant could identify 
its customers); Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 312 (denying class certification on ascertainability grounds 
because consumer-plaintiff could not establish a way for corporate-defendant to identify purchas-
ers of its allegedly faulty weight-loss supplement); Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 
356 (3d Cir. 2013) (reversing certification of class of Sam’s Clubs customers because they were 
unable to establish a method for Sam’s Club to identify its customers); Marcus v. BMW of N. 
Am., LLC (Marcus II), 687 F.3d 583, 612 (3d Cir. 2012) (reversing certification of a class of car 
owners because it could not establish that its class members could be identified by defendant’s 
records); John v. Nat’l Sec. Fire & Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (upholding dismis-
sal of proposed class of homeowner insurance customers because named plaintiff failed the im-
plied ascertainability requirement); Xavier v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 
1078, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (declining to certify proposed class of Marlboro smokers seeking 
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The implied ascertainability requirement has also become the subject 
of a sharp, publicized circuit split between the Third and Seventh U.S. Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals.12 In 2015, the Third Circuit in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc. 
addressed the implied ascertainability requirement and introduced a height-
ened ascertainability standard that could prove fatal for the types of classes 
that the drafters of Rule 23 intended to accommodate.13 In contrast, the 
Seventh Circuit in its 2015 decision in Mullins v. Direct Digital, LLC chose 
as its interpretation a “weak” version of the implied ascertainability re-
quirement, which can be easier on small-claim consumer class actions.14 
This Comment argues that Rule 23 should be amended to adopt an ex-
plicit ascertainability requirement modeled on the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” 
version of the ascertainability requirement.15 Part I provides a brief history 
of the implied ascertainability requirement’s role in the class certification 
process as well as an overview of the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertaina-
bility standard.16 Part II discusses the current circuit split on the application 
                                                                                                                           
medical monitoring on ascertainability grounds); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 
8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (refusing to certify a class of 
Snapple tea drinkers on ascertainability grounds). 
 12 Compare Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163, 172 (imposing a heightened ascertainability standard for 
certification), and Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 312 (vacating a proposed consumer class’s certification 
for ascertainability concerns), with Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58, 662 (explicitly rejecting the Third 
Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard and adopting a “weak” standard instead). The circuit 
split, and its potential impact on small-claim consumer-plaintiffs, has begun to attract media atten-
tion in the wake of Mullins. See generally Carl Goldfarb, Circuits Split on Class Certification 
Requirements, DAILY BUS. REV. (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202
735514936/Circuits-Split-on-Class-Action-Certification-Requirements?slreturn=20150814223844 
(providing an overview of the circuit split created by the Seventh Circuit in Mullins); Michael R. 
Carroll & Burt M. Rublin, 7th Circuit Rejects “Heightened” Ascertainability for Class Actions, 
BALLARD SPAHR, LLP (July 30, 2015), http://www.ballardspahr.com/alertspublications/legal
alerts/2015-07-30-7th-circuit-rejects-heightened-ascertainability-requirement-for-class-actions.
aspx [https://perma.cc/6B5G-CC5K] (explaining the newly created circuit split in a law firm-
published post). 
 13 See 784 F.3d at 163 (articulating that a proposed class must establish (1) that its class is 
objectively defined and (2) that there is an administratively feasible mechanism for identifying 
class members); Ford, supra note 8, at 504 (recognizing that the purpose of Rule 23 is to accom-
modate small claimants and stating that this purpose may be frustrated if courts apply the rule 
rigidly); Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 497 (explaining that a mission of Rule 23 was 
to accommodate individuals who would only prosecute their rights if they could do so as a group). 
 14 See Mullins, 795 F.3d 657 (interpreting the implied ascertainability requirement as simply 
requiring that a class is clearly defined by objective criteria and granting certification of consumer 
class). The court pointed to a series of consumer class actions that have been defeated by height-
ened ascertainability standards in other circuits that may have survived with its own interpretation 
of the implied ascertainability requirement. See id.; see also Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 176–77 (Rendell, 
J., concurring) (discussing how interpreting the implied ascertainability requirement as simply 
requiring a clear class definition would be more consistent with Rule 23’s core policy of accom-
modating small-claim plaintiffs). 
 15 See infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 19–61 and accompanying text. 
38 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:34 E. Supp. 
of the implied ascertainability requirement.17 Finally, Part III argues that 
Rule 23 should be amended to explicitly include an ascertainability re-
quirement modeled on the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of the implied 
ascertainability requirement, which reflects Rule 23’s purpose better than 
the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard.18 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE IMPLIED ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT AND 
THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S HEIGHTENED ASCERTAINABILITY STANDARD 
In the last five years of applying the implied ascertainability require-
ment, the Third Circuit has heightened the ascertainability standard that 
plaintiffs must meet before their class will be certified.19 Section A provides 
a brief history of the ascertainability requirement and its evolution toward a 
heightened standard within the Third Circuit.20 Section B provides the facts 
and procedural history of Byrd.21 
A. A Brief History of the Implied Ascertainability Requirement, from 
Creation to Its Eventual Form in the Third Circuit 
In 1970, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that it was “ele-
mentary” that a class must be adequately defined and clearly ascertainable 
before a court should certify it, and the court included that requirement in 
its inquiry despite it not being written in Rule 23.22 Ten years later, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the application of an implied ascer-
tainability requirement.23 Federal courts applied the implied ascertainability 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See infra notes 62–96 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 97–106 and accompanying text. 
 19 See, e.g., Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163 (articulating a heightened ascertainability standard that 
puts the burden on plaintiffs to establish a way the court may identify class members); Carrera II, 
727 F.3d at 307 (vacating a class certification on ascertainability grounds because plaintiff could 
not establish how the court may identify class members); Hayes, 725 F.3d at 356 (reversing class 
certification on ascertainability grounds because plaintiff did not present a way for class members 
to be identified through defendant’s records); Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 593–94, 612 (discussing the 
policy concerns motivating the Third Circuit’s ascertainability standard, and vacating class certifi-
cation because plaintiff did not meet that standard). 
 20 See infra notes 22–44 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 45–61 and accompanying text. 
 22 See DeBremaecker, 433 F.2d at 734. 
 23 See Simer, 661 F.2d at 669–70 (adopting ascertainability as an implied requirement to class 
certification). The court adopted the implied ascertainability requirement so that it could be alerted 
to any potential burdens that it may face identifying class members before the proceeding. See id. 
It also wanted to ensure that it would be able to identify those individuals injured by class action 
defendants so that they may enjoy any relief granted. See id. Since its adoption in the Seventh 
Circuit, ascertainability as an implied requirement within Rule 23 has also been adopted by the 
First, Second, Third, Fifth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals. See Little v. T-Mobile 
USA, Inc., 691 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[A] plaintiff seeking to represent a proposed 
class must establish that the proposed class is adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” (quot-
2016] Amending Rule 23 to Include an Explicit Ascertainability Requirement 39 
requirement leniently, and with little discussion, in the decades following 
those decisions.24 The non-controversial nature of the implied ascertainabil-
ity requirement during these decades was due to the types of class action 
suits federal courts heard.25 The typical class action cases reaching federal 
courts during this period were financial securities disputes in which each 
class member was easily ascertained from financial records.26 It was nearly 
impossible for consumer class actions to reach federal court and thus courts 
often avoided harder questions about ascertainability.27 
This all changed when Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act 
in 2005, which effectively opened the doors to federal courts for consumer 
                                                                                                                           
ing Debremaecker, 443 F.2d at 734)); Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 591 (including the implied ascertain-
ability requirement as a preliminary matter in a Rule 23 analysis); John, 501 F.3d at 445 (ac-
knowledging ascertainability as part of the Rule 23 certification process); In re Initial Pub. Offer-
ing Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 30 (including the implied ascertainability requirement in the Rule 23 
analysis); Crosby v. Social Sec. Admin. of U.S., 796 F.2d 576, 580 (1st Cir. 1986) (adopting as-
certainability as an implied requirement to Rule 23). 
 24 See, e.g., Dunnigan v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 125, 135–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(quickly concluding that the class was ascertainable because members were clearly identified in 
MetLife insurance records); In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 
F.R.D. 323, 336–37 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (stating that ascertainability was not an issue in the case 
because it was clear who owned a well that was allegedly contaminated); O’Connor v. Boeing N. 
Am., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 311, 327 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (concluding that class was ascertainable after 
little discussion because it was clear to see who lived in the area allegedly exposed to carcino-
gens); see also Jamie Zysk Isani & Jason B. Sherry, Ascertainability: Class Action Certification, 
CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. (BNA), at 2–3 (May 8, 2015). 
 25 See Isani & Sherry, supra note 24, at 2–3. For a federal court to have the subject matter 
jurisdiction required to hear a case, it must have either federal question jurisdiction or diversity 
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331–1332 (2012). Federal question jurisdiction exists when a case 
arises under the Constitution or federal law. Id. § 1331. Diversity jurisdiction exists when the 
amount in controversy is at least $75,000 and the dispute is between citizens of different States or 
between U.S. citizens and citizens of foreign nations. Id. § 1332(a). 
 26 See generally Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) (class action claim under the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983) (secu-
rities fraud class action); In re Cendant Corp. Litigation, 264 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (securities 
fraud class action); In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Secs. Litig., 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999) (securi-
ties fraud class action); DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.3d 624 (7th Cir. 1990) (securities fraud 
class action). 
 27 See Isani & Sherry, supra note 24, at 2–3. Consumer class action cases rarely met the di-
versity requirement for jurisdiction in federal court because each class member had to satisfy the 
amount in controversy requirement, which is difficult when a class is comprised of low-value 
consumer claims. See id. (citing Zhan v. Int’l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (rejecting a 
class action in federal courts because each class member could not satisfy the amount-in-
controversy requirement)). Subject matter jurisdiction in federal court was typically unattainable 
for consumer class actions because consumers did not have standing to sue under the federal laws 
meant to protect consumers from corporate misconduct, like false advertising. See Isani & Sherry, 
supra note 24, at 2–3 (citing Made in the USA Found. v. Philips Food, Inc., 365 F.3d 278, 279–80 
(4th Cir. 2004) (establishing that consumers do not have standing to sue for false advertising under 
the Lanham Act, a federal consumer protection statute)). 
40 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 57:34 E. Supp. 
class action suits.28 Now facing tougher questions regarding class certifica-
tion for small-claim consumer class actions, federal courts have been inter-
preting the implied ascertainability requirement inconsistently.29 
The Third Circuit has set itself apart from the other circuits with its 
application of the implied ascertainability requirement because it requires 
that plaintiffs meet a heightened standard of ascertainability before the court 
will grant certification.30 Two recent cases in the Third Circuit began to 
carve out this heightened ascertainability requirement.31 First, in 2012, the 
Third Circuit reversed a class’s certification on ascertainability grounds in 
Marcus v. BMW of North America, LLC.32 The named plaintiff, Jeffrey 
Marcus, sought relief through a class action claim against BMW for alleg-
edly equipping its cars with faulty tires.33 The district court certified a class 
defined as all purchasers and lessees of certain model-year BMWs equipped 
with the allegedly defective tires sold or leased in New Jersey.34 On appeal, 
the Third Circuit reversed the certification on ascertainability concerns.35 
The court emphasized that the implied ascertainability requirement is not 
simply about defining a class in objective terms, but rather that a plaintiff 
must also show the court that there is an administratively feasible mecha-
                                                                                                                           
 28 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A 
Preliminary Review, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1441 (2008) (“The scope of putative class actions 
that, at the end of the day, [the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005] brings within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of federal courts is very broad.”); Isani & Sherry, supra note 24, at 3. The Class Ac-
tion Fairness Act (“CAFA”) allows a class action to establish diversity jurisdiction in federal court 
as long as the class collectively seeks at least $5 million, rather than requiring that each individual 
member satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement of diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1332(d). 
 29 Compare Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163, 172 (imposing a heightened ascertainability standard for 
its implied ascertainability requirement), and Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 312 (vacating certification 
because plaintiffs failed to meet a heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertaina-
bility requirement), with Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58 (interpreting the implied ascertainability 
requirement as requiring only a clearly and objectively defined class). 
 30 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163; Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 308; Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 592–93. 
The heightened standard has two prongs: (1) the class must be defined by objective criteria and (2) 
there must be “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism” through which class members 
can be identified. See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163 (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355). The Third Circuit 
holds that its heightened ascertainability standard eliminates serious administrative burdens by 
ensuring that the court will not have to conduct “mini-trials” within a class action case to ascertain 
class members. See Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 593. It also holds that its heightened ascertainability 
standard class members who are not present by ensuring that they may receive the “best notice 
practicable.” See id. 
 31 See Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 308; Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 593. 
 32 687 F.3d at 612. 
 33 Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (Marcus I), No. 08-5859 (KSH), 2010 WL 4853308, at 
*1 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2010), vacated 687 F.3d 583. 
 34 Id. at *18. 
 35 Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 588, 594. BMW presented evidence to establish that its records 
would not be able to easily identify the individuals who purchased cars with the allegedly defec-
tive tires. Id. at 594. 
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nism for identifying class members.36 Marcus’s inability to establish that 
BMW’s records could identify class members was what ultimately caused 
the Third Circuit to reverse the class certification.37 
Second, in 2013, the Third Circuit took the ascertainability require-
ment a step further in Carrera v. Bayer Corp.38 Gabriel Carrera brought a 
consumer class action suit against Bayer Corporation for the alleged false 
advertising of its weight-loss supplement.39 The district court certified a 
class defined as “all persons who purchased [the weight-loss supplement] in 
Florida,” and Bayer appealed.40 Carrera, attempting to address the standard 
that the Third Circuit applied in Marcus, prepared for the court a mecha-
nism to ascertain class members.41 It involved class members submitting 
affidavits declaring that they purchased the supplement and how much they 
purchased.42 The court rejected this proposed mechanism, reasoning that 
affidavits could lead to fraudulent claims and limit recovery for true class 
members.43 It concluded that such a threat meant that Carrera’s proposed 
mechanism was not an administratively feasible method for identifying 
class members, and therefore did not satisfy the implied ascertainability 
requirement.44 
B. The Third Circuit Uses Byrd to Articulate Its Two-Pronged, Heightened 
Standard for the Implied Ascertainability Requirement 
In Byrd, the Third Circuit recognized the lack of precision that had 
characterized its recent applications of the implied ascertainability require-
ment and sought to finally set forth a clear standard.45 The court did so by 
articulating a two-pronged test to meet its heightened ascertainability stand-
ard: (1) the class is objectively defined and (2) the plaintiffs can present “a 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. at 594. 
 37 See id. at 588, 594. 
 38 See 727 F.3d at 306 (holding that a plaintiff must present evidence that its class members 
can be identified in an administratively feasible way). 
 39 Carrera v. Bayer Corp. (Carrera I), No. 08-4716 (JLL), 2011 WL 5878376, at *1 (D.N.J. 
Nov. 22, 2011), vacated, 727 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 40 Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 303; Carrera I, 2011 WL 5878376, at *9. 
 41 Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 308. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 310. The court stated that using affidavits from individuals who declare themselves 
class members exposes true class members to the threat of having to share their potential recovery 
with fraudulent class members. See id. Judge Rendell, concurring in Byrd, pointed out that such a 
concern may be out of touch with reality. See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
She stated, “the chances that someone would, under the penalty of perjury, sign a false affidavit 
stating that he or she bought Bayer aspirin for the sake of receiving a windfall of $1.59 are far-
fetched at best.” Id. 
 44 See Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 310. 
 45 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 161–62 (“[T]here has been apparent confusion in the invocation of 
ascertainability in this Circuit . . . . We seek here to dispel any confusion.”). 
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reliable and administratively feasible mechanism” for identifying class 
members.46 
The named plaintiffs in Byrd, Brian and Crystal Byrd, filed a class ac-
tion against Aaron’s, Inc. and its franchisee store Aspen Way Enterprises, Inc. 
(collectively “Defendants”).47 The lawsuit alleged that the Defendants had 
violated the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”).48 
The Defendants operated a business that sells and leases residential and office 
consumer electronics.49 Mrs. Byrd had entered into a lease agreement with 
Defendants to rent a laptop computer, and it was eventually repossessed by 
the Defendants.50 Upon repossession, an agent of Defendants presented Mrs. 
Byrd with a screenshot of a poker website that Mr. Byrd had visited, as well 
as a picture of him playing online poker, which was taken by the laptop’s 
built-in camera.51 
The Defendants allegedly obtained the picture through spyware soft-
ware the company had installed on the laptop it leased to the Byrds.52 The 
spyware was capable of collecting screenshots, keystrokes, and images 
from a computer’s built-in camera.53 The Byrds alleged that the Defendants 
had used this spyware over the course of approximately one month to se-
cretly access the leased laptop 347 times on eleven different days.54 
The Byrds filed a class-action complaint against the Defendants, alleg-
ing violations of the ECPA.55 The Byrds moved to certify the class under 
Rule 23 with the following proposed class definition: “all persons who 
leased and/or purchased one or more computers from Aaron’s, Inc., and 
their household members, on whose computers [the spyware] was installed 
and activated without such person’s consent on or after January 1, 2007.”56 
The district court denied certification on ascertainability grounds.57 It 
reasoned that the Byrds could not satisfy the implied ascertainability require-
ment because they failed to define “household members” in the class defini-
tion and to provide a mechanism for how class members could be identi-
                                                                                                                           
 46 Id. at 163 (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355). 
47 Id. at 158. 
 48 Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc. (Byrd I), Civil Action No. 11-101E, 2014 WL 1316055, at *2 (W.D. 
Pa. Mar. 31, 2014), rev’d, 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 49 Id. at *1. 
 50 Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 159; Byrd I, 2014 WL 1316055, at *1. 
 51 Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 159; Byrd I, 2014 WL 1316055, at *1. 
 52 Byrd I, 2014 WL 1316055, at *1–2. 
 53 Id. at *2. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at *5. 
 57 See id. at *6 (“Because none of class definitions proposed by Plaintiffs satisfies the thresh-
old analysis of ascertainability, the motion to certify the class should be denied.”). 
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fied.58 The Byrds appealed.59 The Third Circuit took the Byrd’s appeal as an 
opportunity to anchor the implied ascertainability requirement to a concrete 
set of guidelines.60 The court reversed the district court’s denial of class certi-
fication and remanded the case to be decided under the new guidelines.61 
II. ASCERTAINABILITY’S ROLE IN CERTIFICATION IS STILL UNSETTLED 
LAW DESPITE THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S CLEAR STANDARD IN BYRD 
The role of the implied ascertainability requirement in the class certifi-
cation process remains unsettled law.62 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
has established a heightened standard for the implied ascertainability re-
quirement, but that standard has yet to garner consensus even within the 
Third Circuit.63 In addition, three months after the Third Circuit’s 2015 deci-
sion in Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Mullins v. 
Direct Digital, LLC rejected the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability 
standard in favor of its own “weak” version of the implied ascertainability 
requirement, creating a circuit split.64 Section A discusses both the Third Cir-
cuit’s 2013 decision in Carrera v. Bayer Corp. and Byrd, two cases that 
demonstrate the conflict within the Third Circuit.65 Section B discusses the 
                                                                                                                           
 58 Id. at *5. 
 59 Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 158. 
 60 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 161–62. The court set forth two prongs for its heightened ascer-
tainability standard for the implied ascertainability requirement: (1) the class is objectively defined 
and (2) the plaintiffs can present “a reliable and administratively feasible mechanism” for identify-
ing class members. See id. at 163 (quoting Hayes, 725 F.3d at 355). 
 61 See id. at 172. 
 62 Compare Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc. (Byrd II), 784 F.3d 154, 163 (3d Cir. 2015) (interpreting the 
implied ascertainability requirement as imposing a heightened ascertainability standard on plain-
tiffs), with Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d at 657–58, 662 (7th Cir. 2015) (explicitly reject-
ing the Third Circuit’s application of ascertainability and instead interpreting a “weak” version of 
the implied ascertainability requirement). 
 63 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172–77 (Rendell, J., concurring) (calling for the end of the height-
ened ascertainability standard that the majority had set forth); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-
2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review) (calling 
upon the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to weigh in on 
Rule 23 in light of the 2013 Third Circuit precedent (citing Carrera v. Bayer Corp. (Carrera II), 
727 F.3d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 2013))). Compare Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163 (articulating a two-prong, 
heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertainability requirement), and Carrera II, 
727 F.3d at 312 (vacating class certification because plaintiff did not satisfy the court’s ascertain-
ability inquiry), with Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172 (Rendell, J., concurring) (advocating for the Third 
Circuit to eliminate its heightened ascertainability standard), and Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at 
*3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review) (arguing that the Third Circuit’s height-
ened ascertainability standard is in conflict with Rule 23’s historical purpose). 
 64 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–58, 662. See generally Goldfarb, supra note 12 (discussing 
the circuit split that the Seventh Circuit created in Mullins when it rejected the Third Circuit’s 
heightened ascertainability standard). 
 65 See infra notes 67–83 and accompanying text. 
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Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of the implied ascertainability requirement 
applied in Mullins and how it differs from the Third Circuit’s approach.66 
A. Division Within the Third Circuit on Its Heightened  
Ascertainability Requirement 
Despite the clear precedent established by Byrd, the Third Circuit has yet 
to settle on an interpretation of the implied ascertainability requirement.67 
Two recent opinions demonstrate that the heightened ascertainability standard 
has failed to garner consensus in the Third Circuit: Judge Ambro’s dissenting 
opinion, joined by three others, in the Third Circuit’s decision to deny en banc 
review of Carrera, and Judge Rendell’s concurrence in Byrd.68 
In 2012, Judge Ambro authored a formative opinion on the implied as-
certainability requirement in the Third Circuit’s decision in Marcus v. BMW 
of North America, LLC.69 In his dissent of the Third Circuit’s decision to deny 
en banc review in Carrera, however, he argued that the Third Circuit had tak-
en the requirement too far.70 He noted that the policy at the core of Rule 23 is 
to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not provide the economic 
incentive for a single person to prosecute his or her rights.71 He stated that 
while he believed that an ascertainability inquiry is important for Rule 23 to 
work, the court must be careful as it decides how difficult the implied ascer-
tainability requirement should be for plaintiffs so as to not disconnect Rule 23 
from its core policy.72 He also pointed out that the court’s decision in Carrera 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See infra notes 84–96 and accompanying text. 
 67 Compare Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172, 174–75 (Rendell, J., concurring) (arguing that the ascer-
tainability standard articulated in Byrd made the implied requirement unreasonably difficult for 
plaintiffs to satisfy), and Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of 
en banc review) (advocating for the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure to look into the implied ascertainability requirement in response to the court’s decision 
in Carrera), with Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 163, 172 (articulating a two-prong, heightened standard for 
the implied ascertainability requirement), and Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 312 (vacating the class’s 
certification because it failed the court’s heightened ascertainability standard by not providing a 
mechanism through which the court could identify who had purchased defendant’s weight-loss 
supplement). 
 68 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172–77 (Rendell, J., concurring); Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at 
*1–3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review). 
 69 See Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC (Marcus II), 687 F.3d 583, 583, 593–94 (3d Cir. 
2012) (establishing a standard for the implied ascertainability requirement that requires that plain-
tiffs establish an administratively feasible method for identifying individual class members so as 
to avoid “mini-trials” during a class action proceeding); see also supra notes 31–37 (discussing 
how the Third Circuit’s decision in Marcus began to carve out the circuit’s heightened ascertaina-
bility standard for the implied ascertainability requirement). 
 70 See Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *1–3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc 
review) (“Our court’s opinion in Carrera gives the impression to many that we now carry [the 
implied ascertainability requirement] too far.”). 
 71 See id. at *2 (citing Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997)). 
 72 See id. at *1–2. 
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could give defendants an incentive to conduct business in a way that makes it 
nearly impossible for class action plaintiffs to find a method for ascertaining 
class members that would satisfy the Third Circuit.73 He therefore called up-
on the Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
to look into Rule 23 and instruct courts as to how difficult the implied ascer-
tainability requirement should be for plaintiffs.74 
In Byrd, Judge Rendell suggested in her concurrence that it was time to 
eliminate the Third Circuit’s heightened standard for the implied ascertaina-
bility requirement.75 She was concerned that it narrows the availability of 
class actions in a way that the drafters of Rule 23 could not have intended.76 
The historical purpose of class actions, she argued, is to provide a mechanism 
through which individuals can prosecute their small-value claims in a way 
that makes economic sense, and it may be defeated by the Third Circuit’s rul-
ing in Byrd.77 She also quoted Judge Ambro’s dissent to the denial of en banc 
review in Carrera to take issue with the Third Circuit’s ruling for allowing 
                                                                                                                           
 73 See id. at *1. In Carrera, the defendant did not sell its weight-loss supplement directly to 
consumers, so it did not have records through which customers could be easily identified. See 
Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 308. Given that this was why the proposed class was found to have failed 
the implied ascertainability requirement, Judge Ambro called the defendant’s behavior a “fortuity 
that will undoubtedly become more prevalent should the Court’s decision become entrenched in 
law.” See Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *1 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc re-
view). 
 74 See Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc re-
view). Rule 23 has been amended seven times since it was adopted with the rest of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure in 1937. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes to 1937, 
1946, 1966, 1987, 1998, 2003, 2007, 2009 amendments. The Judicial Conference’s Committee on 
Rules of Practice and Procedure and the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules are the first to evalu-
ate proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. How the Rulemaking Process 
Works, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-
rulemaking-process-works [https://perma.cc/79LM-EXB9]. If the Advisory Committee chooses to 
explore a proposed amendment, it will ask the Standing Committee for permission to publish a 
draft of the amendment. Id.; see also Thomas E. Baker, An Introduction to Federal Court Rule-
making Procedure, 22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 323, 328–31 (1991) (providing an overview of the 
proposal, review, and promulgation procedures for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure). At that point, judges, practitioners, and the general public will be invited to comment on the 
draft language for the amendment, and, based on those comments, the Advisory Committee will 
“discard, revise, or transmit” the proposed amendment to the Standing Committee. How the Rule-
making Process Works, supra. The Standing Committee then conducts its own review of the pro-
posed amendment and recommends the amendment to the Judicial Conference only if it is satis-
fied with the language. Id.; Baker, supra, at 328–31. The Judicial Conference then recommends 
the proposed amendment to the U.S. Supreme Court with additional proposed changes, if neces-
sary, and the Court may choose whether to promulgate the proposed amendment. How the Rule-
making Process Works, supra. 
 75 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 177 (Rendell, J., concurring) (“I suggest that it is time to retreat 
from our heightened ascertainability requirement in favor of following the historical meaning of 
ascertainability under Rule 23.”). 
 76 See id. at 172. 
 77 See id. at 176–77. 
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defendants the opportunity to thwart a plaintiff’s attempts at class certification 
by conducting business in a way that makes it impossible to easily identify its 
consumers.78 
She proposed replacing the heightened ascertainability standard with 
one that requires only that a proposed class be clearly defined.79 She argued 
that the second prong of the heightened ascertainability standard endorsed in 
Byrd, which requires that plaintiffs establish an administratively feasible 
method through which the court may identify class members, is unnecessary 
and inconsistent with Rule 23’s historical purpose.80 The Third Circuit has 
reasoned that its heightened ascertainability standard helps to prevent fraudu-
lent claims of class membership.81 Judge Rendell rejected this analysis and 
argued that it is unlikely that someone would perjure himself or herself simp-
ly to recover a piece of a class action award because of how insubstantial in-
dividual payouts generally are once damages are distributed to each class 
member.82 In addition, Judge Rendell argued that courts should afford plain-
tiffs the opportunity to work with judges and to identify class members as the 
class action proceeds, rather than requiring plaintiffs to establish a method for 
identifying class members at the outset of litigation.83 
B. The Seventh Circuit Rejects Byrd and Creates a Circuit Split 
Rather than adopt the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability stand-
ard, the Seventh Circuit in Mullins applied a “weak” version of the implied 
ascertainability requirement.84 In Mullins, the court considered a class action 
brought by consumers against Direct Digital, LLC, which advertised that its 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See id. at 173 (quoting Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from de-
nial of en banc review)). 
 79 See Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 177 (Rendell, J., concurring) (“I would therefore . . . hold that (1) 
hereafter, our ascertainability analysis will focus on class definition only, and (2) the District 
Court’s analysis regarding the second prong of our ascertainability was unnecessary.”) 
 80 See id. at 174–77 (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 161 (1974)) (noting 
that the historical purpose of Rule 23 is to provide individuals with small claims a mechanism 
through with they can prosecute their claims in a way that makes economic sense). 
 81 See Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 310; Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 594. 
 82 See Byrd II, 727 F.3d at 175 (Rendell, J., concurring). Judge Rendell stated, “[T]he chances 
that someone would, under penalty of perjury, sign a false affidavit stating that he or she bought 
Bayer aspirin for the sake of receiving a windfall of $1.59 are far-fetched at best.” Id. She was refer-
ring to the facts of Carrera, in which the plaintiff’s request to certify a class in an action against 
Bayer aspirin failed because the court felt allowing class members to identify themselves by sign-
ing an affidavit stating that they were members could violate Bayer’s due process rights. See id. 
(citing Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 310). 
 83 Byrd II, 727 F.3d at 174 (Rendell, J., concurring). Specifically, she observed that this ele-
ment to the heightened ascertainability requirement “puts the class action cart before the horse and 
confuses class certification.” Id. 
 84 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657–59, 662 (interpreting the implied ascertainability requirement 
as simply requiring that a proposed class be defined clearly and by objective criteria). 
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medical product, Instaflex Join Support (“Instaflex”), was clinically tested to 
improve joint flexibility and mobility when in reality it was nothing more 
than a sugar pill placebo.85 The plaintiffs moved to certify the following 
class: “all consumers in Illinois and states with similar laws, who purchased 
Instaflex within the applicable statute of limitations of the respective Class 
States, for personal use until the date notice is disseminated.”86 Invoking Car-
rera, Direct Digital argued that the court should deny class certification on 
ascertainability grounds because the plaintiffs did not present the court with 
an administratively feasible method for determining who had purchased In-
staflex.87 The district court rejected this argument and certified the class.88 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the class certification.89 The 
court acknowledged its own use of the implied ascertainability requirement, 
but rejected the heightened standard endorsed by the Third Circuit in Byrd.90 
The court instead applied its “weak” version of the implied ascertainability 
requirement, which simply requires that a class be defined clearly and by ob-
jective criteria.91 It held that the policy concerns motivating the Third Cir-
cuit’s heightened ascertainability standard are better addressed by carefully 
applying the explicit requirements of Rule 23.92 The court pointed to Rule 
23’s explicit superiority requirement as being able to address the potential 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, No. 13 CV 1829, 2014 WL 5461903, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 
2014), aff’d, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification at 5–6, 
Mullins, 2014 WL 5461903 (No. 1:13-cv-01829) (citing Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 305–09). Direct 
Digital invoked Carrera in its argument because it similarly involved alleged false advertising with 
respect to a medical product. See id. In Carrera, the Third Circuit held that the proposed class was 
not ascertainable because the plaintiffs did not present an administratively feasible way to prove that 
each member had actually purchased the product. See Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 312. Direct Digital 
argued that the same standard should be applied to deny certification of the proposed class in Mullins. 
See Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Class Certification, supra, at 6. 
(“Mullins cannot certify any class because he failed to identify any objective method for ascertaining 
any Instaflex purchasers.”). 
 88 Mullins, 2014 WL 5461903, at *4 (“Plaintiff’s class is ascertainable because it is objective-
ly contained to all individuals who purchased Instaflex for personal use during the [finite] class 
period . . . .”). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that plaintiff’s 
proposed class was ascertainable because it was “objectively contained to all individuals who 
purchased Instaflex for personal use during the class period and the class period is finite.” Id. at 
*2. 
 89 Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657. 
 90 See id. at 657–58 (“We . . . have long recognized an implicit requirement under Rule 23 
that a class must be defined clearly and that membership must be defined by objective criteria . . . . 
We decline to follow [the Third Circuit] . . . . Nothing in Rule 23 mentions or implies [its] height-
ened requirement . . . .”). 
 91 See id. at 657. 
 92 Id. at 658 (arguing that the goals of Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard can 
be better captured by the explicit “superiority” requirement of Rule 23). 
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administrative burdens of a proposed class that the Third Circuit’s heightened 
ascertainability standard is meant to address.93 
The court also took issue with the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertain-
ability standard for requiring courts to dismiss a potentially burdensome 
class at the outset of litigation.94 The Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of 
the implied ascertainability requirement, in contrast, allows the court to take 
a “wait and see” approach to potentially problematic classes, with the op-
tion to decertify a class later in litigation if necessary.95 To illustrate its 
point, the court pointed to several cases in which consumer classes were 
decertified under a heightened standard of ascertainability but may have 
survived in the Seventh Circuit.96 
III. ENDING THE IMPLIED ASCERTAINABILITY REQUIREMENT:  
AMENDING RULE 23 TO EXPLICITLY INCLUDE IT 
Rule 23 should be amended to explicitly include an ascertainability re-
quirement.97 The drafters of Rule 23 hoped to “shake the law of class actions 
                                                                                                                           
 93 See id. at 663. Rule 23(b)(3) requires that the class action device be “superior to other 
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
The Seventh Circuit asserts that Rule 23’s superiority requirement calls upon courts to balance the 
“manageability concerns” of a proposed class with the availability of alternatives for adjudicating 
a proposed class’s claim. See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658, 663. It therefore concludes that a “height-
ened ascertainability standard upsets this balance” by giving “absolute priority” to manageability 
concerns and ignoring the fact that small-value claims often have no alternative to the class action 
mechanism for prosecuting their claims. Id. 
 94 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 663–64. 
 95 See id. at 664. 
 96 See id. at 657 (citing Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 307–12 (weight-loss supplement consumers); 
Xavier v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1089–90 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (cigarette 
smokers); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at 
*12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (Snapple beverage consumers)). 
 97 See LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMMENT TO THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 2 (Nov. 3, 2015), http://www.lfcj.com/uploads/3/8/0/5/
38050985/lcj_comment_to_civil_rules_committee_11-3-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/H35Y-P2EM] 
(advocating to the Rule 23 Subcommittee that Rule 23 needs to be amended to include an explicit 
ascertainability requirement); Mullenix, supra note 5, at 437, 441–44 (calling for Rule 23 amend-
ment and proposing solutions to the confusions caused by the implied ascertainability require-
ment); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2403 (arguing that the ascertainability requirement has done its 
work “in the shadows of implication” and that Rule 23 now needs to be amended to explicitly 
include an ascertainability standard). Robert E. Keeton, former chair of the Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a body respon-
sible for developing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, stated, “Federal Rules of Practice and 
Procedure ought to be user-friendly . . . [and] even superbly drafted rules are at risk of becoming 
less consistent, clear, and readable . . . and the need for amendment is inevitable.” See Robert E. 
Keeton, Preface to BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND EDITING COURT RULES, 
at i (1996). The process of amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure involves several layers 
of consideration and approval that begins with consideration by the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules and ends with the U.S. Supreme Court, which will promulgate the amendment if accepted. 
See How the Rulemaking Process Works, supra note 74. The topic of ascertainability is currently 
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from abstract categories.”98 Now, after years of inconsistent interpretations of 
an implied ascertainability requirement by federal courts, the concept of “as-
certainability” has emerged as a new abstraction from which class action law 
must be shaken through an amendment to Rule 23.99 
The implied ascertainability requirement has become especially prob-
lematic for small-claim consumer plaintiffs.100 Rule 23’s historical purpose 
was to accommodate those types of claims, and an amendment should there-
fore be tailored to returning Rule 23 to that purpose.101 The Seventh Circuit 
court of Appeals’ “weak” version of the implied ascertainability requirement 
would best return Rule 23 to its historical purpose.102 The Third Circuit Court 
                                                                                                                           
listed as “on hold” by the Rule 23 Subcommittee of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 
which means that the committee felt that amendment was not appropriate at its last meeting in 
April, 2015, but that it recognized that it is a developing issue. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL 
RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 89 (Nov. 5–6, 2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/file/
18536/download [https://perma.cc/3FLG-96A9]. 
 98 See Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, supra note 1, at 497. 
 99 Compare Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc. (Byrd II), 784 F.3d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 2015) (imposing a 
two-prong, heightened standard for ascertainability as part of the implied ascertainability require-
ment), with Mullins v. Direct Dig., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 657 (7th Cir. 2015) (interpreting the ascer-
tainability requirement as only requiring that a proposed class be clearly defined by objective 
criteria). See also Stephanie Haas, Class in Session: The Third Circuit Heightens Ascertainability 
with Rigor in Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 59 VILL. L. REV. 793, 804–05 (2014) (providing an over-
view of the inconsistent applications of the implied ascertainability requirement); Mullenix, supra 
note 5, at 424–25 (discussing how application of the implied ascertainability requirement has not 
been consistent among federal courts); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2403 (arguing that Rule 23 needs to 
be amended to reflect a single interpretation). 
 100 See, e.g., Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 172 (household electronics consumers); Carrera v. Bayer 
Corp. (Carrera II), 727 F.3d 300, 312 (3d Cir. 2013) (weight-loss supplement consumers); Hayes 
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 356 (3d Cir. 2013) (Sam’s Club shoppers); Marcus v. 
BMW of N. Am., LLC (Marcus II), 687 F.3d 583, 612 (3d Cir. 2012) (car owners); John v. Nat’l 
Sec. Fire and Cas. Co., 501 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 2007) (homeowners insurance customers); 
Xavier v. Phillip Morris USA Inc., 787 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1078, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (Marlboro 
smokers); Weiner v. Snapple Beverage Corp., No. 07 Civ. 8742(DLC), 2010 WL 3119452, at 
*12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2010) (Snapple tea drinkers); see also Gilles, supra note at 5, at 307 
(discussing how the implied ascertainability requirement has been used repeatedly by federal 
courts to decline certification to consumer class actions). 
 101 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617 (1997) (“The policy at the very 
core of the class action mechanism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do not pro-
vide the incentive for any individual to bring solo action prosecuting his or her rights” (quoting 
Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997))); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 
417 U.S. 156, 161, 186 (1974) (noting that small-claim plaintiffs have no incentive to litigate 
individually, and asserting that “[t]he class action is one of the few legal remedies the small 
claimant has against those who command the status quo”); see also Ford, supra note 13, at 504 
(arguing that Rule 23’s most important purpose is to provide a vehicle for a large group of small 
claimants to seek recovery); Kaplan, Continuing Work, supra note 1, at 390 (a drafter of the 1966 
Rule 23 amendment explaining that the purpose of reformed Rule 23 was to accommodate plain-
tiffs who would not have the economic incentive to pursue a case individually). 
 102 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657 (noting that an application of the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” 
version of the implied ascertainability requirement, which simply requires that a class be objec-
tively defined, may have prevented consumer class actions in other courts from being denied certi-
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of Appeals’ interpretation, which imposes on plaintiffs a heightened ascer-
tainability standard, frustrates that purpose and should therefore not be in-
cluded in an amendment.103 
The Seventh Circuit’s “weak” version of the implied ascertainability re-
quirement simply requires that a class be defined clearly and by objective 
criteria.104 This interpretation of the implied ascertainability requirement, un-
like the Third Circuit’s interpretation, does not allow a defendant the oppor-
tunity to block class certification simply by conducting its business in a way 
that makes it impossible to easily identify its customers.105 By not extending 
this practical immunity to defendants, the Seventh Circuit’s “weak” ascertain-
                                                                                                                           
fication); Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 177 (Rendell, J., concurring) (arguing that the implied ascertainabil-
ity should be interpreted as only requiring a clear class definition so as to be consistent with the 
historical purpose of Rule 23); see also Shaw, supra note 5, at 2397–98 (advocating that, to re-
main consistent with Rule 23’s historical purpose, the policy concerns motivating the Third Cir-
cuit’s heightened standard for the implied ascertainability requirement should be captured by a 
rigorous application Rule 23’s explicit superiority requirement, similar to the Seventh Circuit’s 
“weak” interpretation of the implied ascertainability requirement). 
 103 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 658 (asserting that the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability 
standard gives absolute priority to manageability and therefore prevents Rule 23 from accommo-
dating small-claim plaintiffs); Byrd II, 784 F.3d at 175–76 (Rendell, J., concurring) (expressing 
concern that the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard defeats Rule 23’s core pur-
pose); Carrera v. Bayer Corp., No. 12-2621, 2014 WL 3887938, at *2 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014) (Am-
bro, J., dissenting from denial of en banc review) (arguing that the Third Circuit’s heightened 
ascertainability standard will allow “some wrongs to [go] unrighted” because it makes it certifica-
tion more difficult on small-claim plaintiffs); see also Haas, supra note 99, at 815 (“A heightened 
ascertainability standard is irreconcilable with both the class action’s core policy of incentivizing 
small-claims plaintiffs to seek justice as well as the compensation and deterrence functions of the 
class action mechanism.”); Shaw, supra note 5, at 2397–98 (discussing how the Third Circuit’s 
heightened ascertainability standard for the implied ascertainability requirement is inconsistent 
with the drafters’ intentions for Rule 23). 
 104 See Mullins, 795 F.3d at 657. (“We . . . have long recognized an implicit requirement un-
der Rule 23 that a class must be defined clearly and that membership be defined by objective crite-
ria . . . .”). 
 105 See id. at 668 (“Ascertainability . . . is particularly misguided when applied to a case 
where any difficulties encountered in identifying class members are a consequence of a defend-
ant’s own acts or omissions.” (quoting Daniels v. Hollister Co., 113 A.3d 796, 801 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2015))); Carrera, 2014 WL 3887938, at *1–3 (Ambro, J., dissenting from denial of en 
banc review) (warning that the Third Circuit’s heightened ascertainability standard could allow 
wrongdoers to “[game] the system” and escape liability for their conduct by conducting business 
in a way that makes it impossible to easily identify their customers); see also Shaw, supra note 5, 
at 2398 (citing Gold v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 306 F.R.D. 623, 635 (N.D. Cal. 2013)) (dis-
cussing the ironic results and unfortunate incentives that are created when certification is blocked 
because of a business-defendant’s lack of adequate record-keeping). Defendants in the Third Cir-
cuit have enjoyed this immunity effect because of the heightened ascertainability standard. See 
Carrera II, 727 F.3d at 308, 312 (vacating the lower court’s decision to certify plaintiff’s class 
after defendant presented evidence that its own records were insufficient to identify class mem-
bers); Marcus II, 687 F.3d at 593–94, 612 (stating that certification of plaintiff’s proposed class 
depended on whether or not defendant’s records of the relevant transactions could identify class 
members, and putting the burden on plaintiff to suggest an administratively feasible alternative if 
the records could not). 
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ability requirement makes it easier for small-claim consumer claimants to 
hold corporations accountable for their conduct, and will finally return Rule 
23 to its core policy roots.106 
CONCLUSION 
In Byrd, the Third Circuit articulated its heightened standard for Rule 
23’s implied requirement that a class be ascertainable. This standard has 
proven to be especially hard on consumer class actions. The Seventh Circuit 
created a circuit split when it rejected the Third Circuit’s heightened stand-
ard, and instead held that the implied ascertainability requirement simply 
asks that a class be defined by clear and objective criteria. This interpreta-
tion is easier on consumer class actions, and is therefore more consistent 
with Rule 23’s historical purpose. To ensure that class certification is adju-
dicated consistently in federal courts, and consistently with the historical 
purpose of the class action mechanism, Rule 23 should be amended to ex-
plicitly adopt the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of ascertainability. 
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